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Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elem...
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Tyler Burge has recently argued that quasi-memory-based psychological reductionist accounts of diachronic personal identity are deeply problematic. According to Burge, these accounts either fail to include appropriately de se elements or presuppose facts about diachronic personal identity—facts of the very kind that the accounts are supposed to explain. Neither of these objections is compelling. The first is based in confusion about the version of reductionism to which it putatively applies. The second loses its force when we recognize that reductionism is a metaphysical thesis, not an epistemological one.
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A challenge has recently been levelled against the legal and/or moral legitimacy of some advance directives. It has been argued that in certain cases an advance directive carries no weight in a decision on whether to withhold trea...
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A challenge has recently been levelled against the legal and/or moral legitimacy of some advance directives. It has been argued that in certain cases an advance directive carries no weight in a decision on whether to withhold treatment, since the individual in the debilitating state is not the same person as the person who created the advance directive. In the first section of this paper, I examine two formulations of the argument against the moral legitimacy of the advance directives under review. The second section reviews, and criticizes, an objection to such arguments. In the penultimate section, possible models supporting the viability of the advance directives are considered. The final section makes good on an obligation incurred by the title of the paper.
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Philosophers concerned with the question of personal identity have typically been asking the so-called re-identification question: what are the conditions under which a person at one point in time is properly re-identified at anot...
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Philosophers concerned with the question of personal identity have typically been asking the so-called re-identification question: what are the conditions under which a person at one point in time is properly re-identified at another point in time? This is a rather technical question. In our everyday interactions, however, we do raise a number of personal identity questions that are quite distinct from it. In order to explore the variety of ways in which the Internet may affect personal identity, I propose in this study to broaden the typical philosophical horizon to other more mundane senses of the question. In Section 2,1 describe a number of possible meanings of personal identity observed in everyday contexts and more philosophical ones. With some caveats, I argue that it is the specific context in which the question arises that disambiguates the meaning of the question. Online contexts are novel and peculiar insofar as they afford prolonged disembodied and anonymous interaction with others. In line with our previous conclusion, then, there is reason to suspect that such contexts generate new and sui generis answers to the personal identity question. In Section 3,1 examine this question and, contrary to expectations, largely dispel this suspicion. Finally, in Section 4, I discuss the often-heard claim to the effect that disembodiment and anonymity foster the creation of distinct and incompatible online and offline identities.
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A Firm Persuasion in Our Work," a continuing series in the American Journal of Occupational Therapy, features autobiographical briefs that mark profound engagement and rewarding careers in occupational therapy. The stories feature...
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A Firm Persuasion in Our Work," a continuing series in the American Journal of Occupational Therapy, features autobiographical briefs that mark profound engagement and rewarding careers in occupational therapy. The stories featured have transformational power and can be used as inspirations for sustaining our deep commitment to practice. The narrative of our work journeys can reveal knowledge about leadership and courage. Work journeys are full of adventure and drama with unpredictable and nonrational events (Whyte, 2001).
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Dreger has written a detailed and exhaustive account of the reactions to Bailey's book. She also debates closely the arguments for and against Bailey's position and the criticisms leveled against him. The resulting campaign agains...
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Dreger has written a detailed and exhaustive account of the reactions to Bailey's book. She also debates closely the arguments for and against Bailey's position and the criticisms leveled against him. The resulting campaign against Bailey, as she describes it, is disturbing. One lesson we should all have learned from this is that we live in an Internet world where such reactions are a distinct possibility. I was naive to think that I could make a remark about this book at an International Academy of Sex Research meeting which would stay within the academic community; a lesson for all of us. But contrary to what Dreger was quoted as saying in the New York Times (Carey, 2007), I do not feel that this needs to have a major negative impact on scientific discourse; it might even improve it.
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It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits-more than any other mental faculty-are considere...
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It has often been suggested that the mind is central to personal identity. But do all parts of the mind contribute equally? Across five experiments, we demonstrate that moral traits-more than any other mental faculty-are considered the most essential part of identity, the self, and the soul. Memory, especially emotional and autobiographical memory, is also fairly important. Lower-level cognition and perception have the most tenuous connection to identity, rivaling that of purely physical traits. These findings suggest that folk notions of personal identity are largely informed by the mental faculties affecting social relationships, with a particularly keen focus on moral traits.
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It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke's famous version of Wittgenstein's meaning skepticism is precisely the one that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between d...
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It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke's famous version of Wittgenstein's meaning skepticism is precisely the one that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein's notorious idea that all proofs "create concepts."
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In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are just...
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In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term 'person' is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.
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摘要 :
In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are just...
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In this paper I shall attempt to argue for the simple view of personal identity. I shall first argue that we often do have warrant for our beliefs that we exist as continuing subjects of experience, and that these beliefs are justified independently of any reductionist analysis of what it means to be a person. This has two important implications that are relevant to the ongoing debate concerning the number of persons that are in existence throughout any duration in time: (1) the lack of logically or metaphysically necessary and sufficient conditions for distinguishing one person from another should imply neither that there is only one person nor that personhood is not individuative; and (2) the lack of such universally applicable identity criteria should not imply that the term ‘person’ is a folk term with no real application. In other words, lack of reductionist analysis does not entail lack of existence.
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The sexual and religious ecosystem in Singapore represents an intricate interplay of factors that religious homosexuals navigate to attain a well-adjusted personal identity. A qualitative research project was conducted to understa...
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The sexual and religious ecosystem in Singapore represents an intricate interplay of factors that religious homosexuals navigate to attain a well-adjusted personal identity. A qualitative research project was conducted to understand how Christian and Muslim homosexual men in Singapore integrate their religious and sexual identities. In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine religious homosexuals to elicit responses on their dual-identity experience, and coping strategies. Narrative analysis revealed three themes (and a number of subthemes): (1) Intrapersonal factors (a personal journey, knowledge seeking, reinterpreting belief system, redemption by good deeds, and love prevails over sin), (2) Interpersonal factors (segregating social circles, involvement in the gay community, role models, and social support), and (3) Sociopolitical factors (state and societal tolerance of homosexuals, and homosexual events). Interestingly, the participants assigned positive attributes to being both religious and homosexual, and reported that embodying both identities was enriching than if they had possessed just one of the two identities. This suggests that integrating positive psychological frameworks (e.g., stress-related growth) to existing ones may provide a more holistic account of identity integration among religious homosexuals.
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